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0. Introduction
Evolutionary debunking arguments in ethics aim to use facts about the
evolutionary causes of ethical beliefs to undermine their justification. Global
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (GDAs) aim to undermine the justification
of all ethical beliefs–or all beliefs in non-analytic ethical truths realistically con-
strued. Local Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (LDAs) aim to undermine
the justification of only some of our ethical beliefs. GDAs are often used in
arguments for skeptical or anti-realist metaethical views.1 In contrast, LDAs are
employed in arguments in normative ethics. Singer (2005) and Greene (2008: 43,
76) employ LDAs to argue that we should accept utilitarianism rather than a
deontological view. And de Lazari-Radek and Singer (2012) use a LDA to argue
that we should accept utilitarianism rather than egoism.
Kahane (2011) (2014), Rini (2016), Tersman (2008), and Vavova (2014) argue
for skepticism about the possibility of LDAs. They argue that LDAs cannot be
successful because they over-extend in a way that makes them self-undermining:
if LDAs succeed, they undermine the justification of the ethical beliefs that their
proponents wish to hold onto or lead to a form of moral skepticism. In this
paper I argue that these arguments for skepticism about the possibility of LDAs
are misplaced.
Assessing the plausibility of skepticism about LDAs is important for sev-
eral reasons. First, the LDA for act-consequentialism made by Greene, de
Lazari-Radek, and Singer is perhaps the most interesting new argument for
act-consequentialism made in the last few decades. If good LDAs are impos-
sible, as Kahane, Rini, Tersman, and Vavova allege, this would be a damning
inditement of this argument, and would have a bearing on the more general con-
temporary case for act-consequentialism. More generally, the strategy of making
a LDA in arguing for a particular ethical position is now relatively common-
place; for instance, LDAs are used against the belief that incest is always morally
wrong and in arguments in defence of hedonism against the experience machine
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objection.2 If skeptics about LDAs are right, we should stop making LDAs in
normative ethics altogether. Finally, it would be quite surprising if LDAs could
not work at all. For generally, the causal history of our beliefs can undermine
their justification: if we come to know that we only have a particular belief be-
cause we were hypnotised to have it a few weeks previously, this undermines the
justification of our belief. And proponents of skepticism about LDAs share this
view.3 So it would be surprising if there were something about evolution or ethics
that precluded the debunking of particular ethical beliefs via facts about their
evolutionary causes.
My aim in this paper is not to argue for any particular ethical view. Rather
my aim is to assess Kahane, Rini, Tersman, and Vavova’s skepticism about
LDAs and get clear on LDAs, when and where they can be made, and their
prospects of success. But in order to show that Kahane et al.s skepticism about
LDAs fails I need to show that LDAs can be made by proponents of partic-
ular ethical views without these LDAs undermining the ethical beliefs of their
proponents. It seems to me that proponents of desire-constrained accounts of
reasons—proponents of a first-order internalist account of practical reasons—
are most clearly able to make LDAs without such self-defeat. So, I argue that
such internalists can make LDAs. But because many ethicists are externalists
rather than internalists, I also attempt to show that externalists about reasons
can make LDAs. But readers shouldn’t read too much into my arguing that
LDAs can be made by internalists or particular kinds of externalists; I don’t
intend to endorse or argue for internalism or a form of externalism here. These
arguments are only intended to show the possibility of making LDAs without
self-defeat.
In §1 I sketch two prominent LDAs that Kahane, Tersman, and Vavova
target. I then outline Kahane, Tersman, and Vavova’s similar arguments that not
only do these particular LDAs fail, but the way in which they fail shows that there
is a more general problem with LDAs that should lead us to a general skepticism
about the possibility of non-self-undermining LDAs. In §2 I argue that we should
understand the epistemic principle and key claims of LDAs in a particular way
and I argue that this way of understanding and constructing LDAs shows that
Rini’s argument for skepticism about LDAs fails. In §3 I argue that, given the
way of constructing LDAs proposed in §2, proponents of internalist accounts
of normative reasons can make LDAs that are not self-undermining in the way
that Kahane, Tersman, and Vavova claim that all LDAs are. In §4 I argue that
certain externalists about normative reasons can also make LDAs that are not
self-undermining. In §5 I briefly sketch the slightly complicated implications of
my argument for the work that LDAs can do in normative ethics.
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1. LDAs and Skepticism about LDAs
LDAs normally aim to undermine the epistemic status of particular be-
liefs by undermining the status of the judgments they are based on which in-
clude moral intuitions (Tersman 2006: 391). We can understand moral intuitions
broadly as moral judgements that are accepted by someone not merely on the
basis that they follow from a moral theory or principle that they accept or more
specifically as intellectual seemings on the basis of which we come to hold certain
particular moral beliefs (ibid.; Stratton-Lake 2016: §1.1).
Kahane (2011) understands LDAs as having two components. First, a nor-
mative epistemic component which involves a claim about how irrelevant influ-
ences on our judgments—such as evolution—can undermine the justification of
our beliefs based on these judgments. Second, a causal empirical component
claiming that particular evolutionary factors caused particular ethical judge-
ments of ours. For the time being we can understand the epistemic component
to involve the principle that if our belief that p is the result of a process that is
irrelevant to the truth of whether p, then our belief that p is not justified. To
see how a principle along these lines can seem plausible, suppose that you see
an object in front of you that seems blue to you. You then come to know that
you’ve taken a pill that makes you see red things as blue things. It seems that
your justification for believing that the object is blue, which you previously had
based on your perceptual seeming, is undermined.
1A. LDA’s Empirical Claims
The empirical component of a LDA has two parts: first, a debunking claim,
that evolutionary factors caused particular ethical beliefs of ours; second, a
vindicatory claim, that there are ethical beliefs of our which are not similarly
explained by evolutionary irrelevant influences.
Singer (2005) articulates a LDA. Its debunking claim holds that our deon-
tological intuitions, such as the widespread intuition that we should not push
the heavy man to his death to save five people in the footbridge trolley case, are
the result of a non-moral-truth-tracking evolutionary process. He argues that we
have evolved to have immediate, strong, negative emotional responses to hitting,
pushing, or strangling others but not to have such reactions to the infliction of
violence by switch turning because historically we lived in small groups where
violence could only be inflicted in such an up close and personal way (ibid.
347–348). In contrast, according to Singer’s LDA’s vindicatory claim, no such
evolutionary story can be told for the intuition that it is bad if one person is
killed and the (impartial consequentialist) intuition that it is less of a tragedy if 1
person is killed than if 5 people are killed. He claims that this intuition ‘does not
seem to be one that is the outcome of our evolutionary past’ because it is not
evolutionary fitness-enhancing for us to have the intuition that it is wrong or bad
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that those who are strangers to us are killed; we have no reason to believe that
‘love of mankind, merely as such’ would have evolved through natural selection
(ibid. 350).
Non-derivative reasons to ϕ are reasons to ϕ the normative force of which
does not derive from the normative force of other reasons to ϕ. For instance,
according to one view about promise-keeping, there are (non-derivative) reasons
for us to keep our promises even if no good would come of our keeping them.
According to another view, the only reasons for us to keep our promises are
(derivative) reasons that derive from the good consequences of our keeping our
promises or our being disposed to keep them. De Lazari-Radek and Singer
(2012: 22) make a LDA. Its debunking claim targets (non-derivative) partial and
self-interested reasons. They argue that the judgment or intuition that we have
stronger (non-derivative) reason to help our own children than to help complete
strangers just because they are our children is likely to lead to reproductive
success. This is because making such a judgment disposes one to do more to
help one’s own children than strangers, and individuals who help their own
children more than strangers are more likely to have children who survive and
reproduce. And they similarly argue that having the judgment that we have
non-derivative self-interested reasons, that is, stronger reasons to promote our
own interests rather than others (just because they are our own), would lead
to reproductive success—by leading us not to sacrifice ourselves for complete
strangers for instance.
They then argue that Sidgwickian self-evident intuitions in universal benevo-
lence cannot be similarly evolutionarily debunked; this is their vindicatory claim.
An intuition is self-evident if it is an intuition that is not derived from another
intuition; self-evident intuitions are intuitions that are ‘evident in and of them-
selves’ rather than intuitions that one has on the basis of an argument.4 The
Sidgwickian self-evident intuitions that de Lazari-Radek and Singer (2012: 24)
have in mind are intuitions that ‘the good of any one individual is of no more im-
portance, from the point of view . . . of the Universe, than the good of any other’
and ‘as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally’.5 They argue that
when we have these intuitions self-evidently—after engaging in a process of ratio-
nal reflection—these intuitions are not prone to evolutionary debunking. If these
Sidgwickian intuitions are self-evident to us, we see (non-derivative) reasons to
care about the good of all individuals, including those who are total strangers to
us, equally and impartially. But de Lazari-Radek and Singer (2012: 19–20) argue,
citing a barrage of evolutionary biologists, that
No Direct Stranger Concern. Evolution would only select us to see direct (non-
derivative) reasons to care about ourselves, our relatives, and those to whom we
bear a special group or partner relationship for their own sake; evolution would
not select us to see reasons to care about strangers for their own sake. Although
evolution might select us to see reasons to help and not harm strangers because
of the benefits of helping them (e.g. new trading partners) and the possible costs
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of harming them (e.g. their group harming us or our families), evolution would
not select us to see reasons to non-instrumentally care about strangers.
So, according to de Lazari-Radek and Singer, if we come to believe in the truth
of impartial consequentialism or utilitarianism on the basis of direct self-evident
Sidgwickian intuitions, then these beliefs in impartial consequentialism are not
debunkable.
1B. Skepticism about the possibility of LDAs
Kahane, Tersman, and Vavova all make a similar argument against LDAs.
They assume the truth of LDAs’ debunking claims but argue that their truth would
prove too much. They make two claims. First,
(1) The LDAs that have been made implausibly over-extend in a way that
makes them self-undermining.
Kahane (2011:119-120) and Vavova (2014: 93–95) discuss Singer’s (2005) LDA.
They argue that if this argument’s debunking claim is true, it’s vindicatory claim
is false because if kin altruism was evolutionarily selected for, then impartial
altruism is a reasoned extension of kin altruism. The debunking premise claims
that kin altruism is an irrelevant influence. But the reasoned extension of an
irrelevant influence is still an irrelevant influence. Tersman (2006: 401) also dis-
cusses Singer’s (2005) LDA. He argues that there are many possible debunking
stories that debunk the impartialist intuitions that figure in Singer’s vindicatory
premise. For instance, impartial consequentialism is plausibly deeply influenced
by Christian ethics, so impartialist intuitions may be the result of our Christian
heritage.
Kahane (2014) assumes that de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s claim, No Direct
Stranger Concern is correct but argues that this is not enough for them to establish
the kind of vindicatory claim that they want. Kahane (2014: 331–334) argues that
if de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s (2012) debunking premise is true, then our beliefs
that pain is bad and that pleasure is good would be evolutionarily debunked too;
for many, such as Street (2005: 150), have argued that being disposed to treat
pain as bad and to pursue pleasure helped our ancestors to avoid injury and
death. This counts as an over-extension because de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s
(2012) argument is an argument in favour of utilitarianism. But utilitarianism
requires a theory of well-being. And Kahane argues that a form of utilitarianism
that did not hold that pain is one of things that we should minimise would be an
extremely odd form of utilitarianism that de Lazari-Radek and Singer would not
accept. So, if their debunking premise is true, their vindicatory premise is true
only in a way that they would not be interested in and we should not care about:
the kind of beliefs in utilitarianism that are immune to debunking are beliefs in
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a very unattractive form of utilitarianism that they do not hold and would think
implausible.
Kahane, Tersman, and Vavova argue that their case for (1) generalizes to
show that
(2) LDAs in general are implausible because they over-extend: they extend
to undermine the justification of such a large set of ethical beliefs that
they entail a form of moral skepticism.
Tersman (2006: 403) says that LDAs in general threaten to collapse into argu-
ments for a more general moral skepticism. He holds this more general claim
because there are so many different possible debunking explanations of different
moral judgments that we hold. And if non-consequentillaist intuitions are de-
bunked on the basis of the evolutoinary foces that lead to them, then similarly
all other moral judgments willl be debunked on the basis of the possibility of
debunking explanations of what caused them. Kahane (2011) (2014) argues that
(2) is true because if LDA’s debunking claims are true, then we are not justified
in believing that pain is bad and that pleasure is good. Kahane (2011: 120–121)
says that if anything would survive a purge of our ethical and normative beliefs
that are infected by irrelevant evolutionary influences it is likely to be more in line
with a form of Nietzschean egoism than utilitarianism before concluding that
‘[i]f [LDAs] work at all then, in one way or another, they are bound to lead to
a truly radical upheaval in our evaluative beliefs’. Similarly, Kahane (2014: 334)
says,
Utilitarianism is often viewed as an extremely counterintuitive view; many find
Singer’s normative views troubling, even repugnant. But if we take the goal of
purging all evolutionary influence from our normative views seriously enough,
we will end up with a view that is so radically divorced from common sense, and
so distant from any familiar ethical theory, that, by comparison, Singer’s own
utilitarianism will seem almost like old-fashioned common sense.
Vavova (2014: 94–95) similarly claims that LDAs ‘just cannot provide an ap-
propriately selective argument that targets all and only the intended beliefs.’ She
makes this conclusion just on the basis of her argument that the debunking
premise of Singer’s LDA generates the debunking of consequentialist and utili-
tarian intuitions too. Presumably, she thinks that showing that Singer’s argument
has this implication shows that LDAs more generally implausibly overgeneralize
because our consequentialist intuitions are our intuitions about reasons to do
good for others (ibid: 95). And a moral system without such altruistic reasons
wouldn’t be much of a moral system at all.
In the rest of this paper I will argue that there is not a more general problem
here: LDAs can be made that do not generate a form of skepticism; even assuming
(1) is true, (2) is false. In making this argument I will assume, as the skeptics
about LDAs that I have been discussing do, that the debunking premise of the
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LDAs discussed in §1A are true, and that the arguments that proponents of these
LDAs make for these premises are sound.
2. How to make a LDA
How we understand the epistemic principle in LDAs has implications for
whether we should be skeptics about the possibility of non-self-undermining
LDAs or not.
2A. How to Understand LDAs Epistemic Principle
Kahane (2011: 111) and Clarke-Doane (2012: 319) understand the epistemic
principle at work in LDAs as:
Insensitivity. If we would have believed that p even if not-p, then this fact (or our
reasonably believing this) undermines or defeats the justification of our belief
that p.
On this view, consequentialist LDAs argue that we would have had deontological
beliefs even if they were false, but it’s not the case that we would have had
impartial consequentialist beliefs even if they were false.
However, White (2010: 581) as well as Bogardus (2016: 644)—in a paper
discussing the use of Insensitivity in evolutionary debunking arguments—have
argued that Insensitivity is implausible. Suppose that we are jury members and
we have overwhelming evidence that a defendant is guilty: we have eyewitness
testimony, DNA evidence, finger prints, etc. It seems that we are justified in
believing that the defendant is guilty. But we would have believed that the defen-
dant is guilty even if they were not. For if a vast conspiracy was in operation,
we would have the same seemingly overwhelming (but misleading) evidence. And
so Insensitivity implausibly entails that we are not justified in believing that the
defendant is guilty.
There is an epistemic principle close to Insensitivity that avoids this problem,
namely
Good Reason to Believe Unreliable. If (i) there is good reason for us to believe
that X occurred and is causally responsible for it seeming to us that p, and (ii)
we should believe that X would make it seem to us that p even if not-p, then
our justification for believing that p on the basis that it seems to us that p is
undermined or defeated.
Good Reason to Believe Unreliable does not entail that we are not justified in
believing that the defendant is guilty in the jury case. This is because in the jury
case we have no good reason to believe that a vast conspiracy has taken place to
frame the defendant. And Good Reason to Believe Unreliable would only entail
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something about the status of our belief that the defendant is guilty if we had
good reason to believe that a vast conspiracy involving the planting of misleading
evidence had taken place.6
I have encountered the following objection: we have good reason to believe
that (*) the court has behaved just as it would if a conspiracy had taken place.
And the fact that (*) fact undermines the justification of our belief that the
defendant is guilty.
However, (*) does not undermine our justification for believing them to
be guilty; this is just what White and Bogardus take the jury case to show.
And so it is a virtue of Good Reason to Believe Unreliable that it does not
entail that (*) undermines our justification for believing the defendant to be
guilty. Furthermore, concerns about evolutionary and other kinds of genealogical
debunking are supposed to be distinct from the concerns motivating wholesale
epistemological skepticism. But the kind of reasoning in this objection —and
Insensitivity—motivates wholesale epistemological skepticism. For if we were
brains in vats being manipulated by an evil demon to believe that we have bodies,
we would believe that we have bodies even though we do not. But our being a
brain in a vat is a merely logical possibility, rather than a live possibility that we
have good reason to believe might be happening; evolutionary or genealogical
debunking arguments are supposed to be stronger than arguments for wholesale
epistemological skepticism precisely because we know that evolution happened
and happened in various ways. So, although we have no positive good reason
to believe that we are brains in vats, we do have positive good reason to believe
that we have been manipulated by evolution in various ways. And this makes
a difference to what we can justifiably believe (if we are not epistemological
skeptics!)7
Our intuitions about cases provide us with reasons to accept Good Reason
to Believe Unreliable too. Suppose that Blake signs up for an experiment. She’s
shown a short video and then given some data on virtual reality therapy for anx-
iety disorders, which is a topic that she knows nothing about. She finds the data
compelling. But then she arrives home to find an email from the experimenters
which tells her that the experiment was one attempting to ascertain the effec-
tiveness of visual priming. Participants were divided into two groups. The video
that one group were shown used subliminal cues to prime that group towards an
interpretation of the data they were later shown; the other group’s video had no
subliminal cues. The experimenters tell her that they found a striking correlation:
all the primed participants believed as they were primed and thought that the
data on VR therapy showed that it was effective. However, the experimenters
tell her that they cannot disclose to her whether she was in the primed group or
not. It seems that in this case Blake’s justification for believing that VR therapy
is effective is undermined: after receiving the email she is no longer justified in
having this belief. She might have been lucky enough to be in the unprimed group
and to in fact respond to the data rationally; however, she has some good reason
to believe that she was not in that group for half of the subjects were primed to
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misread the data and so there is a good chance that she was one of the primed
participants.8 In this case (a) Blake should believe that if something happened
to her (being primed by experimenters), then she would form a particular belief
about some matter (that there is very good evidence of the effectiveness of VR
therapy) and that belief would not be sensitive to the truth of that matter: she
would believe that there is very good evidence that VR therapy is effective even if
there were not. And (b) there is good reason for her to believe that this something
(being primed by the experimenters) in fact happened to her. And it seems that
the justification of the relevant belief of Blake’s is undermined in virtue of (a)
and (b) Vavova (2018: 143–144). So, cases like this support.
Good Reason to Believe Unreliable. If (i) there is good reason for us to believe
that X occurred and is causally responsible for it seeming to us that p, and (ii)
we should believe that X would make it seem to us that p even if not-p, then
our justification for believing that p on the basis that it seems to us that p is
undermined or defeated.
One quick clarification: ‘Good reason’ in Good Reason to Believe Unreliable
should be taken to mean some non-trivial or relatively strong reason. I want
to leave it open exactly how strong the reason has to be for our justification
for believing that p to be undermined, but the reason can’t be too weak. For
instance, suppose that the investigators’ email explained that there was a 1/1000
chance that Blake had been primed. This might be some weak reason for her to
believe that she’s been primed. But in this scenario, the justification of Blake’s
belief that VR therapy is effective would not seem to be defeated or (significantly)
undermined. (For those seeking a bit more precision, suppose, for instance, that
R is a good reason to believe that p only if the probability of p given R is >0.5).9
So, it seems that we should understand LDAs as involving Good Reason
to Believe Unreliable as their epistemic principle—or that they are better con-
structed using this principle than Insensitivity; indeed some skeptics of LDAs,
such as Vavova (2014), already argue for a very similar conclusion. (I discuss
how Good Reason to Believe Unrealisble can be tweaked to avoid certain fur-
ther objections in a footnote).9 But, as we’ll see this has implications for how
we should understand LDAs as well as for the plausibility of skepticism about
LDAs.
2B. Implications of this way of constructing LDAs
For convenient short-hand, let’s say that when Good Reason to Believe Un-
reliable holds of some X, p, and belief that p, we have good reason to believe
that our belief that p is caused by a non-truth-tracking process with regards to
whether p. If Good Reason to Believe Unreliable is the epistemic principle at work
in LDAs, then we should understand the two empirical premises in LDAs as
having the following form:
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Debunking. For some set of moral judgments S1 we have good reason to believe
that S1 are caused by a non-truth tracking process such as evolution. (E.g. we
have good reason to believe that our moral intuition that we ought not push the
heavy man was caused by a non-truth-tracking process).
Vindicatory. For some other set of moral judgments S2, we do not have good
reason to believe that S2 are caused by a non-truth tracking process such as
evolution. (E.g. we do not have good reason to believe that Sidgwickian self-
evident intuitions are caused by a non-truth-tracking process).
With this account of how LDAs can be plausibly constructed in hand we are
in a position to see how LDAs can be made that avoid Regina Rini’s (2016)
argument for skepticism about LDAs. Rini argues that all LDAs fail because
LDAs necessarily generate an infinite justificatory regress. She first argues that
all LDAs rely on moral judgments. LDAs rely on claims of the form: if particular
moral judgment set S were caused by a particular psychological or evolutionary
process P, then S are insensitive to the moral truth because P is insensitive to
the moral truth. But, according to Rini, if we make LDAs against some moral
judgments or intuitions and thereby show that this set of moral judgments or
intuitions are insensitive to the moral truth, then we have to consider whether we
should generalize ‘from this to worry about the reliability of other sets of moral
judgments’. Rini (2016: 683, 681–682) says that
[t]he point here is meant to be intuitive . . . [f]or instance, if you’ve just learned
that some of your important perceptual experiences are unexpectedly unreliable,
then you have at least some reason to wonder about the reliability of other
perceptual experiences.
This shows, according to Rini, that good LDAs must schematically involve the
claims that
(a) moral judgments of set S were caused by process P, which is insensitive
to the moral truth; and
(b) the belief that process P is insensitive to the moral truth was caused by
process P*, which is sensitive to the moral truth.
Rini then argues that in this case LDAs must lead to a vicious infinite justifica-
tory regress. This is because, if in order to be justified in making LDAs involving
claims like (a) we need to be justified in making claims like (b), then in order to
be justified in making claims like (b) we must be justified in making claims like:
(c) the belief that process P* is sensitive to the moral truth was caused by process
P**, which is sensitive to the moral truth. And in this case, we will have to be
justified in claiming that: (d) the belief that process P** is sensitive to the moral
truth was caused by process P***, which is sensitive to the moral truth; and so
on ad infinitum. So, all LDAs must fail because they lead to a vicious infinite
justificatory regress.
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However, we should reject Rini’s claim that good LDAs must involve (b) as
well as (a). Good LDAs only need to make claims of the form of (a) and claims
of the form:
(b*)we have no good reason to believe that the belief that process P is insensitive
to the moral truth was caused by a process that is insensitive to the moral
truth.
And we are not under any pressure to justify claims of the form of (b*) via
some further claim (some analogue of (c)) in the way that we are under epistemic
pressure to justify claims of the form of (b) via claims of the form of (c). So,
LDAs do not lead to an infinite justificatory regress. This just follows from the
account of LDAs I’ve proposed. I’ve argued that we should understand LDAs
as only involving:
Debunking. For some set of moral judgments S1 we have good reason to believe
that S1 are caused by a non-truth tracking process such as evolution; and
Vindicatory. For some other set of moral judgments S2, we do not have good
reason to believe that S2 are caused by a non-truth tracking process such as
evolution.
Rini’s argument relies on the assumption that in order to make a good debunk-
ing argument, debunkers need to show that the moral judgments they wish to
preserve were not the product of an irrelevant influence; but this is not the case,
they just need to show that we lack good reason to believe this.
The view that LDAs involve (b*)/Vindicatory rather than (b) fits with our
intuitions about the perception case that Rini uses as an analogy. If we find out
that some of our perceptions are caused by a process that we have good reason
to believe is not truth-tracking, we should thereby question whether the same is
true of all our perceptions. But if we then find that our other perceptions are not
(obviously) caused by the same off-track process and we have no good reason to
believe that the process that caused them is a non-truth-tracking process, then
we no longer have reason to worry about our other perceptions; the fact that we
found that some of our perceptions are off-track no longer gives us any reason
to worry about whether our other perceptions are off-track or not.10
Understanding LDAs in this way also seems to undermine Tersman’s argu-
ment for
(2) LDAs in general are implausible because they over-extend: they extend
to undermine the justification of such a large set of ethical beliefs that
they entail a form of moral skepticism.
Tersman (2006: 403) claims that in order to show that one’s LDA does not
collapse into a GDA ‘one must show that there are intuitions for which no
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debunking explanation can be given or where the debunking explanations are
inferior to non-debunking ones’. But this is not right: in order to show that
one’s LDA does not collapse one only needs to show that there are intuitions
that we lack good reason to accept a debunking explanation of. So, contra Ters-
man, the fact that for any ethical judgment, there are many possible debunking
explanations of this judgment does not on its own create problems for LDAs.11
A further clarification of the structure of LDAs will yield further implica-
tions later in this paper. We should not pick out the intuitions in Debunking and
Vindicatory by their content, but rather by the process and/or reason for having
these beliefs. This fits with our intuitions about the VR therapy case discussed in
2A. Suppose that Alice is not in the study—and does not know about the study
or about Blake—but she has read all the evidence about VR therapy and has
come to believe that it is effective. The fact that the epistemic status of Blake’s be-
lief that VR therapy is effective is undermined—due to being in the study—does
not establish that the epistemic status of Alice’s belief that VR therapy is effective
is undermined. This is because the process leading to Alice’s judgment is distinct
from the process leading to Blake’s judgment. Furthermore, the way we pick out
the judgments or intuitions in Debunking and Vindicatory should be sensitive to
the reasons for which these judgments are held (if there are such reasons: some
such judgments may be self-evident intuitions). Suppose that Alex believes that
there are true moral claims because she believes that it is wrong to push the heavy
man and if that is right, there are true moral claims. But Singer’s debunking story
is correct, so that her belief about the trolley case is undermined. In this case, her
belief that there are true moral claims is undermined too. But suppose that Beth
believes that there are true moral claims because she believes that it is analytic
that murder is wrong and so she judges that the conditional claim, if φ-ing is a
murder, then φ-ing is wrong, is a true moral claim. None of the premises on the
basis of which Beth believes that there are true moral claims is debunkable. (The
view that we should not pick out the sets of intuitions in the debunking and
vindicatory claims via their content also fits with de Lazari-Radek and Singer
(2012) and Kahane’s (2014) discussions of LDAs; see §1).
All this establishes that we should understand LDAs as taking the following
schematic form:
Epistemic Premise. Suppose that: (i) there is good reason for us to believe that
X occurred and caused us to have judgment J that p; and (ii) we should believe
that if X occurred and caused us to have judgment J that p, then we would have
J even if not-p. If (i) and (ii) hold, then our justification for believing that p on
the basis that we have J is undermined or defeated.
Debunking Premise. For some set of moral judgments S1 that p (e.g. pain is bad),
we have good reason to believe that (a) (evolutionary process) X caused us to
have S1, and that (b) if X caused us to have S1, we would have S1 even if not-p.
Vindicatory Premise. For some set of moral judgments S2 that q (e.g. it is better
that more lives are saved), there is no X such that we have good reason to believe
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that (a) (evolutionary process) X caused us to have S2, and (b) if X caused us to
have S2, we would have S2 even if not-q.
Conclusion. Moral beliefs that p based on a a judgment in set S1 are not justified,
but moral beliefs that q based on a judgment in S2 are, or may still be, justified;
irrelevant evolutionary influences undermine the epistemic status of moral beliefs
that p based on a judgment in set S1 but do not undermine the epistemic status
of moral beliefs that q based on a judgment in set S2.12
In the next two sections I’ll show, contra LDA skeptics, that we can hold that the
debunking premise is true for some sets of moral judgments and beliefs whilst
simultaneously holding that the vindicatory premise is true for another set of
moral judgments and beliefs.
3. Internalist LDAs
Many accept an internalist constraint on reasons according to which, a
consideration is a reason for an agent to perform an action only if that action
promotes some desire or aim that they have.13 For instance, if classical music
does nothing for you, and going to a particular classical concert wouldn’t do
anything else for you (your friends aren’t going, you wouldn’t fulfil a promise
that you want to keep, etc.), there’s no reason for you to go to the concert.
There is a first-order normative view held by the majority of those who accept
an internalist constraint. According to this view, (i) this internalist constraint
holds, and (ii) we have reasons to promote at least most of the desires and aims
that we have; hereafter I’ll refer to this first-order view as internalism.14
My contention in this section is that at least many beliefs in internalism
are not vulnerable to evolutionary debunking because these beliefs are based
on judgments that we lack good reason to believe to be caused by non-moral-
truth-tracking evolutionary processes—importantly, this is not to say that we
have good reason to believe that these judgments are the result of a moral-truth-
tracking process (see 2B above). To make good on this contention I’ll first explain
the judgments and intuitions on the basis of which internalists normally claim
to accept internalism. (In explaining this, however, I’m not claiming that their
reasons for accepting internalism are good reasons—LDAs try to undermine the
justification of one set of moral beliefs without undermining the justification
of another set, they do not simultaneously try to show that this other set is
positively justified).
3A. The Internalist Judgments that LDAs do not undermine
Internalists commonly cite one of the following four judgments (which may
be constituted by intuitions or other reasons) for their acceptance of internalism.
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First, some internalists, such as Williams (1995b: 189, 194), hold that claims
about an agent’s reasons for action must say something distinctively about that
agent and how that action and its normative status link up to that agent in
particular. Since, otherwise reasons claims wouldn’t be distinctive claims: to
claim that an agent has a reason to φ would be to say nothing more than that it
would be good if they φd. If we accept this claim, then, these internalists claim,
we must accept internalism.
Second, some, most clearly Manne (2014: 91), argue that it is only when we
take-up an interpersonal or second-personal stance towards another that we can
be said to reason with them ‘as opposed to ordering them about, coercing them,
or trying to “manage” their behaviour’. And a consideration is a reason for an
action only if it is apt to offer it (or ideally would be apt to offer it) to another
person when we are ‘reasoning with her, or (similarly) offering her collaborative
advice or friendly suggestions about what she ought to do’. But Manne (ibid.:
103) says that intuitively to her, if an agent A genuinely has no motivation that
would be served by their ϕ-ing, and we come to know this, we cannot aptly claim
that there is a reason for A to ϕ in a rational interpersonal conversation with
them about (or when advising them about) whether they ought to ϕ. And if all
this is right, then internalism holds.15
Third, many internalists claim that we can preserve the relationship be-
tween normative and motivating reasons only if we accept internalism. Accord-
ing to these internalists, if R is a normative reason for A to ϕ, R must be a
counter-factual version of A’s motivating reason to ϕ; R must be the reason for
which a counter-factual version of A ϕs. And only internalism can secure this
relationship between normative and motivating reasons.16
Fourth, Markovits (2014: 58–65) and Goldman (2009: 68–73) argue that
we should accept internalism because of the relationship between practical and
theoretical reasons. Reasons for us to believe propositions depend on what we
already believe and the standards of procedural rationality; we have reason to
believe that p only if some consideration constitutes good evidence for p given
what we already believe. So, reasons for belief are constrained by our internal
belief-related states. But in this case, we should analogously hold that our reasons
for action depend on our aims or desires. That is, that reasons for action are
analogously constrained by our internal action-related states. For practical and
epistemic reasons stand in the same warranting (reason) relation but just warrant
different things (beliefs and actions respectively).17
These four judgments (intuitions and/or acceptances of considerations or
arguments) lead internalists to accept internalism. We lack good reason to believe
that the acceptance of these judgments by internalists is the result of an off-track
process such as a non-moral-truth-tracking evolutionary process. Regarding the
first consideration, we do not have good reason to believe that non-moral-truth
tracking evolutionary forces favoured our judging that claims about an agent’s
reasons for action must say something distinctive about that agent. For instance,
our having these views would not make us and our family and friends more
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likely to survive. And similarly, we do not have good reason to believe that a
non-moral-truth-tracking evolutionary process would favour our believing that
reasons must be the kinds of things that it is apt to cite to another in reasoning
with and advising others, or that normative and motivating reasons and practical
and epistemic reasons must be the same kinds of things and related to our internal
mental states in the same or analogous ways to one another.18Call this set of
four judgments on the basis of which internalists accept internalism, internalist
judgments. As I’ve explained, there seems to be a good case that
Internalist Vindicatory Premise. There is no X such that we have good reason
to believe that (a) evolutionary process X caused internalists to have internal-
ist judgments, and (b) if X caused internalists to have internalist judgments,
internalist would have them even if internalism were false.
I have encountered the following objection to my argument for this claim: (A)
a belief in internalism makes one more effective at persuading others to adopt
one’s normative preferences; (B) being more effective at persuading others to
adopt one’s normative preferences is fitness-conducive. (B) holds because effective
persuaders have a better chance of encouraging social norms that favour the
persuader or their offspring. (A) holds because according to internalism, reasons
for agents to perform actions are always tied to their motives. And appealing to a
person’s existing motives is a much more effective means of persuading someone
than demanding that they do things that are disconnected from their motives.
So, Internalist Vindicatory Premise is false.
There are two problems with this argument. First, we lack good reason to
believe (A). Perhaps (A) does hold but in order for us to have good reason to
believe it we would need correlational data that shows that those who are disposed
to accept internalism are more effective persuaders than those who do not accept
it. But internalism isn’t overwhelmingly dominant in moral philosophy; many
philosophers reject it including most if not all impartial consequentialists—for
whom reasons are just tied to impartial value—and others such as Scanlon
(1998: appendix) and Brunero (2017). We might think that if internalists were
better at persuasion than non-internalists, we should expect internalism to be
dominant in the field. Furthermore, non-philosophers tend to be disposed to
reject internalism because of its implications such as that serial killers have no
reason to refrain from killing someone if so refraining would not serve one of
their desires or aims.19 Finally, it’s not obvious why a belief in internalism would
make one better (or pro tanto good) at persuasion. Since non-internalists agree
with internalists that when you want to persuade someone to do something it
is better to cite a consideration that is connected to their motives because our
actions are the products of our motives.
The second problem with this argument is that, as I explained in §2B, LDAs
try to undermine/vindicate the justification of beliefs based on particular judg-
ments. To undermine the epistemic status of a particular belief with content
C based on judgment J it is not enough to undermine the epistemic status of
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some beliefs with that same content; one needs to undermine the epistemic status
of a belief with content C based on J. But in this case to debunk internalist beliefs
based on the four judgments that I’ve been discussing this objection would need
to debunk these judgments. But it cannot do this: even if believing in internalism
is fitness enhancing because such a belief makes one more adept at persuading
others, believing that claims about reasons and claims about value should be
understood to be distinct or that practical and theoretical reasons should be un-
derstood to have a similar structure does not make one more adept at persuading
others.
It might seem that my argument does not show that internalists’ positive
first-order normative judgment that there are normative reasons for everyone to
promote their desires cannot be debunked. However, we lack good reason to
believe that evolution would have selected for beings who hold that everyone has
normative reasons to promote all of their desires. There are two reasons for this.
First, desires are essentially dispositional states such that to the extent that we
desire to have or do X, we are to the same extent disposed to have or do X (at
least if we can).20 In this case, judging that we have reasons to satisfy our desires
could not further dispose us to do that which promotes our desires. Second,
desires are too contingently linked up to our own and our family’s survival. We have
desires for all kinds of things. Many people’s desires for pleasure, power, or fame
exceed their desires for what’s good for their friends and family and what would
enable their friends and family to survive. In this case, evolution’s selection of
beings for reproductive success would not involve the selection of beings who see
reasons to promote these desires. Many people desire above everything else that
they complete particular projects (works of art for instance), the completion of
which do not benefit—and in fact harm—their friends and family (as is made
clear by Williams’s (1981: 22–23) Gauguin who neglects his family because he
finds it more important to become a painter). And some people desire their own
pain or pain for their own family and friends. In this case, belief that there are
reasons to promote all our desires is too contingently tied up with that which
promotes reproductive success to be a judgment that evolution would dispose
us to have. Having this belief would too often lead us to do things that are
harmful to ourselves and our kin and would frustrate reproductive fitness. So,
we at least do not seem to have good reason to believe that the judgment that
we have reasons to promote our desires would be fitness-enhancing (and may
have some positive good reason to believe that having this judgment would not
be fitness-enhancing).
Perhaps evolutionary biologists or philosophers of biology will show that the
judgment that we have reasons to promote all our own desires whatever they are
is fitness-enhancing. I have not been able to find any considerations that favour
this view in the relevant literature. Nor do the arguments that LDA skeptics
make show that the judgment that we have reasons to promote all of our desires
would be selected for. For instance, Kahane (2011) (2014) argues that beings
who didn’t think that pain is bad and enjoyment and the absence of pain is good
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wouldn’t last very long because they would be going around injuring themselves.
But beings that didn’t think they have reasons to promote all of their desires
wouldn’t be doing this; for so long as they desire certain things they would be
just as motivated to do them anyway.
3B. Internalists can make LDAs without over-extension
With the internalist vindicatory claim in hand, internalists can make a LDA.
They can hold the debunking premise of Singer (2005) or de Lazari-Radek and
Singer’s (2012) arguments, according to which we have good reason to believe that
our deontological judgments or judgments about partial reasons are the result
of an off-track evolutionary process. Either of these debunking claims combined
with the internalist vindicatory premise and the epistemic principle discussed
in §2 will yield the conclusion that: we can be justified in believing internalism
but we cannot be justified in believing that there are deontological or partial
reasons that outstrip such internal reasons. Evolutionary irrelevant influences do
not undermine the justification of beliefs in internalism but do undermine the
justification of beliefs in partial and deontological reasons that outstrip internal
reasons. In this case, Tersman, Kahane, and Vavova are mistaken that LDAs
must over-extend and undermine themselves.
It might be objected that if (a) we lack good reason to believe that internalist
judgments are the product of an off-track evolutionary process, then (b) we
lack good reason to believe that our judgments about deontological and partial
reasons are the result of an off-track evolutionary process. Assessing whether
that is the case is beyond the scope of this paper. I am merely arguing that if
we accept skeptics about LDAs’ assumptions, which include the negation of (b),
skepticism about LDAs does not follow.
I have encountered two responses to my argument that internalists can make
LDAs without self-defeat.21 First, the LDAs that I’ve been discussing do no
interesting work for internalists because internalists’ already believe that there
are no non-derivative deontological or partial reasons for agents to perform
actions that outstrip those reasons they have to promote their own desires and
goals.
However, in order for these LDAs to do interesting work for internalists it
only needs to be the case that internalists can wield LDAs to show that others,
their opponents—as well as those who have no belief (yet) about whether inter-
nalism holds or who are on the fence about this—are not justified in believing
that there are non-derivative external deontological and/or partial reasons. And,
as I’ve shown, internalists can wield these arguments for this purpose.
Second, internalists who make evolutionary debunking arguments are just
making GDAs because internalism is a metaethical view, which involves a reduc-
tive analysis of reasons, rather than a first-order view in normative ethics. And
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in this case I have not shown that LDAs can be made without over-extension or
self-defeat.
However, the internalist view that I discussed involved no such reductive
analysis, and many, such as Korsgaard (1986) and Scanlon (2014: 5), understand
internalist views like the one that I’ve discussed to involve a substantive first-order
view of the practical reasons there are rather than a metaethical view, namely,
that the only normative reasons there are are reasons that link up to our desires.
Furthermore, given that, as I’ve argued, internalists can wield LDAs against
specific types of (non-internalistically constrained) reasons without self-defeat,
this fact on its own shows that internalists can make LDAs regardless of whether
internalism involves or entails a metaethical view. The important feature here
is whether the arguments that are being made are local or not, that is, whether
the arguments that are being made aim to undermine the justification of all
ethical judgments (or all non-analytic ethical judgments construed objectively or
realistically) or just some sub-set of ethical judgments; and, as I’ve been arguing,
internalists can make such a local debunking argument.
As I discussed in §1B, Kahane (2011: 103, 120–121) argues that successful
LDAs will entail that the only ethical views that we can be justified in believing
are views that constitute ‘a truly radical revision of our evaluative outlook’. So,
do (all) internalist views constitute radical revisions of our evaluative outlook?
If they do, internalist LDAs will over-extend in the way that Kahane claims that
all LDAs over-extend.
Most of us have aims that would be served by acting morally: most of us
care about the well-being of others, as well as caring about avoiding blame and
punishment, and not looking bad in front of others. Internalism might entail
that some extremely unusual people have no reasons to refrain from doing things
that we believe to be wrong but it’s not obvious that this would constitute a truly
radical revision of our evaluative outlook rather than just a sad truth about how
some human beings are constituted (Manne 2014). Furthermore, many including
Korsgaard (1996), Markovits (2014: ch. 4–6), Schroeder (2007: ch. 7), and Finlay
(2008) have argued that not only is internalism not radically revisionary but that
the counter-examples to it fail; so the view that internalism is radically revisionary
is at least controversial. And it seems that Kahane believes that the only successful
LDAs will be uncontroversially radically revisionary. For Kahane (2011: 120)
seems to believe that successful LDAs would entail that we are only justified in
accepting a radically revisionary evaluative outlook because they would entail
that we are only justified in accepting something like a Nietzschean perfectionist
anti-moralistic outlook which is both intended to be radically revisionary and is
uncontroversially radically revisionary.22
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4. Externalist LDAs
Externalists about reasons do not accept internalists’ subjective constraints
on reasons. There is at least one way in which externalists can also make LDAs
that avoid LDA skeptics’ charge of over-extension and self-undermining. This
way of making a LDA involves a controversial empirical claim. Namely, the
controversial empirical claim of de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s that I discussed in
§1A:
No Direct Stranger Concern. Evolution would only select us to see direct (non-
derivative) reasons to care about ourselves, our relatives, and those to whom we
bear a special group or partner relationship for their own sake; evolution would
not select us to see reasons to care about strangers for their own sake. Although
evolution might select us to see reasons to help and not harm strangers because
of the benefits of helping them (new trading partners) and the possible costs
of harming them (their group harming us or our families), evolution would not
select us to see reasons to non-instrumentally care about strangers.
De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2012: 19–20) say the following in defence of this
claim:
Richard Dawkins has argued—as the title of his early work, The Selfish Gene,
suggests—that actions that involve sacrificing an organism’s prospects of sur-
viving and reproducing have evolved because they benefit the organism’s genes,
largely through favoring kin. He does not hesitate to draw the conclusion that
“much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal love and the welfare of
the species as a whole are concepts that simply do not make evolutionary sense.”
Pierre van den Berghe has said flatly, and no doubt too bluntly, that “we are pro-
grammed to care only about ourselves and our relatives.” Richard Alexander, in
The Biology of Moral Systems, writes: “I suspect that nearly all humans believe
it is a normal part of the functioning of every human individual now and then to
assist someone else in the realization of that person’s own interests to the actual
net expense of those of the altruist. What this greatest intellectual revolution of
the century [i.e., the individualistic perspective in evolutionary biology] tells us
is that, despite our intuitions, there is not a shred of evidence to support this
view of beneficence, and a great deal of convincing theory suggests that any such
view will eventually be judged false.”
In Unto Others, Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson have forcefully challenged
this individualistic perspective in evolutionary theory. They argue that evolution
could have selected for actions that benefit groups to which individuals belong,
rather than for actions that benefit the individuals themselves. For the argument
we are about to make, therefore, it is vital to understand that, while Sober and
Wilson are challenging the views of Dawkins, van den Berghe, and Alexander,
they do not argue that evolution could have selected for the kind of universal
benevolence required by Sidgwick’s axiom. As they put it, “our goal in this
book is not to paint a rosy picture of universal benevolence. Group selection
does provide a setting in which helping behavior directed at members of one’s
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own group can evolve; however it equally provides a context in which hurting
individuals in other groups can be selectively advantageous. Group selection favors
within-group niceness and between-group nastiness.”23
I don’t know whether No Direct Stranger Concern is true. But the skeptics of
LDAs that I’ve been discussing generally claim to not be interested in contesting
this or similar claims. For instance, Vavova (2014: 79), noting that not even
proponents of debunking arguments think that they have conclusive grounds for
their empirical claims, asks ‘[s]o why take [these arguments] seriously? Because
the philosophically interesting question is not whether some empirical claim
is true, but what follows about the rationality of our beliefs if something like
it were true’. Tersman (2006: 400–401) appears to grant Singer a claim along
the lines of No Direct Stranger Concern.24 And in his response to de Lazari-
Radek and Singer’s LDA, Kahane (2014: 329) says that ‘although [he has] some
serious reservations about the way that de Lazari-Radek and Singer defend [their]
empirical claims’ his argument that their LDA and all LDAs are self-undermining
‘will not directly challenge them or rely on any similarly controversial empirical
speculation . . . Instead, I will argue that even if we grant these claims, the authors
fail to address the worry that utilitarian appeals to evolutionary debunking are
ultimately self-undermining’. (It’s also worth noting that Kahane notes what is
presumably his most serious reservation about the way de Lazari-Radek and
Singer defend their empirical claims in a footnote and it has nothing to do
with No Direct Stranger Concern).25 So, for the purpose of assessing Kahane,
Tersman, and Vavova’s arguments for skepticism about LDAs we can grant No
Direct Stranger Concern.
Consider the following propositions,
Non-Violence to Strangers. There is a strong non-derivative reason for us to
refrain from killing or assaulting innocent strangers;
Save the Lives of Strangers. There is a strong non-derivative reason for us to save
the lives of innocent strangers if we can easily do so.
Non-Violence to Strangers and Save the Lives of Strangers are intuitively self-
evident to many. But, assuming No Direct Stranger Concern, beliefs based on
these intuitions, if they are direct and self-evident, are not vulnerable to debunk-
ing. This is because these intuitions are about how we ought to act regarding
strangers rather than those with whom we have a kin, community, or other
group relationship. And it follows from No Direct Stranger Concern that evolu-
tion would not select us to have direct self-evident intuitions as to the truth of
these propositions. (Note that it is consistent with the view that evolution would
not select us to see Non-Violence to Strangers and Save the Lives of Strangers as
directly intuitively self-evident that evolution would selects us to see derivative
instrumental, but not non-derivative non-instrumental, reasons to help strangers).
An obvious objection here is that our intuitions that Non-Violence to
Strangers and Save the Lives of Strangers hold are not self-evident; rather these
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intuitions are derived from direct intuitions of the truth of the more general
claims that
Reasons of Non-Violence. There is a strong non-derivative reason for us to refrain
from killing or assaulting others; and
Reasons to Save Lives. There is a strong non-derivative reason for us to save the
lives of others if we can do so easily.
However, first, it is not obvious that we do derive Non-Violence to Strangers
and Save the Lives of Strangers from Reasons of Non-Violence and Reasons to
Save Lives. Suppose that we see someone that we don’t know. It seems directly
intuitive to us that we have a reason not to assault them and not just because
of the bad additional consequences for us or others that this might lead to. The
intuition that we have that there is a reason for us not to assault this person
that we don’t know is not derived from a more general intuition that there is a
reason for us not to assault others.26 So, at least some of the intuitions that we
have that support Non-Violence to Strangers are not derived from the intuition
that Reasons of Non-Violence holds; more generally, many have claimed that
our particular moral judgments are not all derived from judgments about more
general principles.27 For instance, in the combination of the switch and footbridge
trolley cases we judge that one action is wrong and the other is not but given
that there is a dearth of plausible non-Kammian principles distinguishing the
two cases, it does not seem that our judgment is the result of applying a principle
to the cases.
Second, assuming No Direct Stranger Concern, even if our intuitions about
Non-Violence to Strangers and Save the Lives of Strangers are derived from our
intuitions about Reasons of Non-Violence and Reasons to Save Lives, there is
no good evolutionary debunking explanation of our having direct self-evident
intuitions that Reasons of Non-Violence and Reasons to Save Lives are true.
For Reasons of Non-Violence and Reasons to Save Lives make no reference to
ourselves, our relatives, and those to whom we bear a special group or partner
relationship. And so No Direct Stranger Concern implies that evolution would not
select us to have direct self-evident intuitions of their correctness. (The obvious
objection here is that evolution just isn’t that well targeted: it might select us
to judge that there are non-derivative reasons not to assault all as a way of
getting us to not assault our family. This may well be true, but if No Direct
Stranger Concern is true, then this could not be the case. So, the objection here
is to No Direct Stranger Concern, which, as I’ve discussed, LDA skeptics do not
challenge).
Now, there are various plausible weak impartialist claims our belief in which
do not seem vulnerable to debunking such as the claim that if we have non-
derivative reasons to aid and refrain from killing some agents, then we have non-
derivative reasons to aid and refrain from killing all agents. Or the claim that if
we have non-derivative reasons to treat some agent in some way, then we have
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reasons to treat all agents in that way.28 These claims seem self-evident to many.
And, assuming No Direct Stranger Concern, beliefs in these impartialist claims
based on direct self-evident intuitions about these claims are not vulnerable to
debunking. And the combination of such impartialist claims and Non-Violence
to Strangers and Save the Lives of Strangers entails that Reasons of Non-Violence
and Reasons to Save Lives hold.
Assuming No Direct Stranger Concern, there is another set of (external) rea-
sons that we can believe in without our beliefs in these reasons being susceptible
to debunking. Manne (2017: 9, 5–8) draws attention to what she thinks of as
a subset of desires, bodily imperatives. Bodily imperatives are the mental states
that we are in when we are in states of agony or hunger, are thirsty, or are
freezing; they ‘are the sorts of states which torturers are able to use against their
victims. For when the body is protesting, people can be broken’. It seems that
we have non-derivative reasons to stop people from being in these states. But
if these states are just fundamentally desires—as Manne argues—then we have
non-derivative reasons to promote the desires of others. Furthermore, it seems to
me directly intuitive that we have non-derivative reasons to stop strangers from
being in these states of agony, hunger, or great discomfort; when I come to judge
that there are such reasons, I’m not first judging that there are reasons to stop
myself and my friends and family from being in these states and then general-
izing to the view that there must be reasons for me to stop anyone from being
in these states. But, in this case, if we assume No Direct Stranger Concern, our
intuition that there are such non-derivative reasons to promote others’ desires
are not susceptible to evolutionary debunking. In this case, if we generalize from
such a judgment to the view that we have non-derivative reasons to promote
others’ desires—via a non-debunkable impartialist claim—this generalized belief
will not be susceptible to evolutionary debunking.29
So we have a set of judgments: that we have (external) reasons of non-
violence, to save others’ lives, and to promote others’ desires. This set of judg-
ments are judgments that are based on impartialist generalizations from intu-
itions that we have reasons to promote strangers’ desires, save their lives, and not
be violent towards them. Call this set of judgments externalist impartial judg-
ments. And call the view that there are such generalized externalist reasons of
non-violence, to promote others’ desires, and save their lives, external impartial
reasons. If we assume No Direct Stranger Concern, it seems to follow that we can
argue:
Externalist Vindicatory Premise. There is no X such that we have good reason
to believe that (a) evolutionary process X caused us to have externalist impartial
judgments, and (b) if X caused us to have externalist impartial judgments, we
would have them even if there were not external impartial reasons.
I do not have space to fully address objections to my argument that if No Direct
Stranger Concern holds, then we should accept Externalist Vindicatory Premise.
But analogues of the moves that I made to defend the internalist vindicatory
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premise in §3 can be made to defend this claim. And with Externalist Vindicatory
Premise in hand externalists about reasons can adopt the debunking premise of,
for instance, de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s (2012) argument, according to which
we have good reason to believe that our judgments about partial reasons are the
result of an off-track evolutionary process. Some externalists can then justifiably
hold that they and others can be justified in their beliefs in externalist impartial
reasons but that we cannot be justified in our beliefs in partial reasons. So,
assuming No Direct Stranger Concern, externalists about practical reasons can
also make LDAs without these LDAs being self-undermining.
5. The Role of LDAs in Normative Ethics
In this paper, I’ve shown that Kahane, Rini, Tersman, and Vavova’s skep-
ticism about the possibility of LDAs is misplaced. LDAs do not necessarily
over-extend or undermine themselves. Non-self-undermining LDAs can be made
by internalists about reasons. And given an empirical assumption that skeptics
about LDAs themselves grant, externalists can too. (At least assuming with LDA
skeptics that the debunking premises of Singer (2005) and de Lazari-Radek and
Singer’s (2012) LDA are correct). But what do these conclusions mean for the
role of LDAs in normative ethics?
I can only very briefly sketch the implications of my arguments here—and
my discussion of these implications will assume that the debunking premises of
Singer (2005) and de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s (2012) arguments hold. It seems
that one implication is that, at least as things stand, contra de Lazari-Radek and
Singer (2012), a LDA cannot be made that undermines the justification of all
beliefs in all forms of egoism. Since, as I argued in §3, internalist views are not
vulnerable to evolutionary debunking; and (certain) internalist views may seem
to be akin to a form of egoism.30 And contra Singer (2005), it seems that a LDA
cannot be made that undermines the justification of all deontological beliefs.
Since, in §4 I argued that, given the empirical claims made by Singer (2005) and
de Lazari-Radek and Singer (2012), we can hold beliefs about reasons to refrain
from harming or killing others, which do not seem to be consequentialist, that
are not vulnerable to evolutionary debunking. So, LDAs are possible but the
most well-known LDAs do seem to fail to establish what they try to establish.
However, this does not show that LDAs cannot do significant piecemeal
work in normative ethics. For LDAs can undermine the justification of our
beliefs in particular sets of non-derivative reasons. Although LDAs may not
be able to undermine the justification of all beliefs in egoism or deontology,
they can undermine the justification of all beliefs in external non-derivative
partial and (external) self-interested or prudential reasons (§1, §2). And many
consequentialists and deontologists, such as Crisp (2006), Portmore (2011: ch. 1)
and Keller (2013), have held that there are non-derivative self-interested and/or
partial reasons. Furthermore, if we should reject de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s
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(2012) controversial empirical claim, No Direct Stranger Concern, then it might
be that LDAs can be made that undermine all beliefs in external reasons.
I believe that LDAs can be plausibly developed that undermine the justifi-
cation of beliefs in further different kinds of non-derivative normative reasons.
I’ll sketch one example of such a possibility. Consider what we can call non-
derivative backward-looking reasons, that is, non-derivative reasons for us to
keep promises, punish others, and have hostile reactions towards wrongdoers;
these reasons are backward-looking because they are reasons to do things just
solely in virtue of actions in the past. The case that our beliefs in such non-
derivative backward-looking reasons can be evolutionarily undermined has been
made by philosophers including Joyce (2006: 24–26) and Olson (2014: 142). Ac-
cording to this case, evolution would favour our having the intuition that there
are non-derivative (backward-looking) reasons for us to keep promises regardless
of whether there were such reasons. For it would be evolutionarily beneficial for
us to be disposed to judge that it is right in itself to keep promises and wrong
in itself to break them and that there are reasons for us to keep these promises
for their own sake. For individuals and families that are in communities that
can make agreements with other individuals and communities to divide tasks,
labour, and shares of goods are more likely to survive than individuals that are
in communities that cannot make such agreements. Just as evolution favours kin
altruism, evolution favours the acceptance of norms the acceptance of which by
individuals disposes those individuals to keep their agreements. And accepting
the view that it is wrong in itself to break a promise makes individuals more
likely to keep their promises.31
Similarly, evolution would seem to favour the acceptance of norms of pun-
ishing and having hostile reactions (for its own sake) to those who breach agree-
ments and who breach other norms regardless of whether such norms tracked
the objective normative truth because communities in which people will punish
(for its own sake) those who break agreements are communities in which peo-
ple are less likely to break agreements.32 So, intuitions that we ought to punish
and/or blame those who breach agreements for its own sake will be favoured by
evolution regardless of whether such intuitions track the normative truth.33
So, we have good reason to believe that evolution would favour our having
the intuition(s) that we have non-derivative backward-looking reasons even if
there were no such reasons. And in this case, given the epistemic principle that
I developed in §2, Good Reason to Believe Unreliable, it seems to follow that
our justification for believing that there are non-derivative backward-looking
reasons (such as reasons to keep promises and punish for its own sake) is un-
dermined. This case seems as strong as Singer’s (2005) and de Lazari-Radek and
Singer’s (2012) case—which LDA skeptics grant—for the view that evolution-
ary influences undermine the justification of our beliefs in deontological, and
self-interested and partial reasons.
The conclusion that our beliefs in non-derivative backward looking reasons
are not justified would have significant implications for normative ethics. For
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many significant normative ethical theories involve the claim that there are non-
derivative backward-looking reasons to punish wrongdoers (for its own sake)
and/or to keep promises (for its own sake). For instance, W.D. Ross’s (1930)
ethical theory involves such non-derivative reasons or duties.34 And Darwall’s
(2006) influential second-personal moral view involves the claim that there are
such reasons to keep promises for its own sake.
So, LDAs are possible and can do significant work in normative ethics,
just not exactly the work that some have thought that they can do: instead
of showing that we should accept one big theory (utilitarianism) over another
(egoism, deontology) they can show that we cannot be justified in holding that
there are certain types of (non-derivative) reasons though we can be justified in
holding that there are other types of (non-derivative) reasons.
One final issue. It might seem that the conclusion that LDAs cannot show
that we should accept one big theory over another is not right. For, as I discussed
in §1B, Kahane (2014) argues that we cannot be justified in holding any plausible
account of well-being on the basis of intuitions about what things are good or
bad because intuitions such as that pain is bad for us and that pleasure is good for
us are debunkable. And without a plausible account of well-being, utilitarianism
is implausible. So, LDAs show that we cannot be justified in accepting a big
theory, namely utilitarianism.
However, I do not believe that things are quite so simple, for an unfortunately
complicated reason. According to the buck-passing account of value (BPA) for
something to be good is for there to be reasons for us to have pro-attitudes
towards it.35 In Rowland (2019: 154–158) I argued that the BPA is compatible
with internalism and that the combination of BPA and internalism does not yield
an implausible account of value. So, even if the only beliefs in reasons that are
not debunkable are beliefs in internalist reasons, we might be able to construct a
plausible account of value out of these internal reasons. On this account of value
it will be good for everyone to get what they want. We could then combine such
an account of value with the content of the Sidgwickian intuitions that ‘the good
of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view . . . of the
Universe, than the good of any other’ and ‘as a rational being I am bound to
aim at good generally’; these are the intuitions that de Lazari-Radek and Singer
(2012: 24) claim not to be debunkable.36 So, if we have internalist intuitions as
well as Sidgwickian intuitions, then, somewhat paradoxically we may be able to
have non-debunkable beliefs in a form of utilitarianism.
There is still a lot of work to be done here. The implications of my argument
are most generally that the role of LDAs in normative ethics is complicated and
that LDAs can be made but with some difficulty. But contra LDA skeptics, it is
possible for LDAs to play some significant role in normative ethics.37
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Notes
1. See Joyce (2006) and Street (2006). The ‘global’ and ‘local’ debunking terminol-
ogy is due to Kahane (2011).
2. See Crisp (2006: 121-122).
3. See Vavova (2018).
4. Stratton-Lake (2016: §1.1).
5. Sidgwick (1907: 381–82).
6. Vavova (2018:142-147).
7. Vavova (2014: 80-87).
8. This is Vavova’s (2018: 143-144) case.
9. Good Reason to Believe Unreliable may need a little tweaking. As it stands it
entails that if we acquire good scientific evidence that p, which might turn out to
be misleading evidence that p, we are not justified in believing that p on the basis
of this evidence; since in such a case we may have good reason to believe that
our acquiring good evidence that p would make us believe that p even if not-p.
This objection may show that it needs to be specified in Good Reason to Believe
Unreliable that X does not bear on whether p and is irrelevant to whether that
p. It is not circular or ad-hoc to add this stipulation. For it is uncontroversial
in the VR therapy case that being primed by an experimenter does not bear on
whether VR therapy is effective.
However, it seems that we must specify that we have reason to believe that X
does not bear on whether p and is irrelevant to whether p that is independent as
to whether we accept p or not; see Vavova (2014: 81-82). For instance, suppose
that you are an anti-vaxxer who believes that medical schools tout myths about
the pedigree of vaccines and you know that your friend Alex only believes that
vaccines are effective because they went to medical school. You cannot plausibly
give Alex reason to believe that she is not justified in believing that vaccines
are effective just by showing her that she only believes in the effectiveness of
these vaccines because she went to medical school; this is because your reason
for believing that medical school is an irrelevant influence on beliefs about the
effectiveness of vaccines is not independent of your belief that vaccines are in-
effective which she does not share. In contrast, in the VR therapy case we have
independent reason to believe that Blake’s judgment that VR therapy is effective
is caused by a process that is irrelevant to whether VR therapy is effective; for
our belief that being primed is irrelevant to whether VR therapy is effective does
not depend on any beliefs about whether VR therapy is effective. (The same
seems true for the view that evolutionary influence is an irrelevant influence. For
many’s belief that evolutionary influence is irrelevant influence is a belief that it
independent of whether they believe that utilitarianism or deontology is true, for
instance; see infra note 10).
So, it might be that we should revise Good Reason to Believe Unreliable in
the following way:
Good Reason to Believe Unreliable*. If (i) there is good reason for us to believe
that X occurred and is causally responsible for it seeming to us that p, (ii) we
should believe that X would make it seem to us that p even if not-p, and (iii)
we have good reason to believe that whether X occurred is irrelevant to whether
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p that is independent of our beliefs about whether p, then our justification for
believing that p on the basis that it seems to us that p is undermined or
defeated.
The additional third clause does not matter too much for the core purpose
of this paper, for it only comes into play when (i) and (ii) are satisfied; and, as
I’ll argue in §3-4, they are not for certain internalist and externalist judgments.
However, there are certain points at which holding Good Reason to Believe Un-
reliable* rather than the unrevised version of this principle does matter, see infra
notes 10 and 22.
10. If we understand the epistemic principle in LDAs as based on Good Reason
to Believe Unreliable*—supra note 9—then LDAs would seem to need positive
reason to hold that evolutionary forces regarding our judgments about the moral
status of φ-ing are irrelevant to the truth about the moral status of φ-ing that
is independent of our beliefs about the moral status of φ-ing. And we may not
be able to find such independent reason. For some philosophers hold that the
moral status of φ-ing is determined by what evolution would select us to believe
about the moral status of φ-ing. However, this would only show that LDAs have a
slightly more limited target, namely the beliefs of those who assume that the moral
status of φ-ing is not determined by what evolution would select us to believe.
(Or that these LDAs work conditional on the assumption that evolution does
not determine objective morality). Many egoists, consequentialists, deontologists,
and believers in partial reasons hold that what we morally ought to do outstrips
what would be best from an evolutionary perspective: the normative outstrips
the natural. So, this is not a great problem for proponents of LDAs.
11. For a further response to Tersman’s argument, see infra note 22.
12. Good Reason to Believe Unreliable*—supra note 9—implies only slightly differ-
ent principles, namely that the following third clauses be added to these three
principles:
Epistemic Premise* . . . .and (iii) we have good reason to believe that whether X
occurred is irrelevant to whether p that is independent of our beliefs about whether
p . . .
Debunking Premise* . . . .and (c) we have good reason to believe that whether X
occurred is irrelevant to whether p that is independent of our beliefs about whether
p . . .
Vindicatory Premise* . . . .and that (c) we have good reason to believe that
whether X occurred is irrelevant to whether q that is independent of our beliefs
about whether q . . .
13. Finlay and Schroeder (2017).
14. See the discussion below.
15. See also Williams (1995a: 36), Markovits (2014: 55), and Smith (1995).
16. See Williams (1995a: 39) and Raz (2011: ch. 2).
17. Stratton-Lake (2002: xxv-xxvi).
18. It has been put to me that this judgment might be debunked because there will be
an evolutionary story about why we find analogies compelling. However, we lack
good reason to believe a particular story and we lack good reason to believe that the
process identified is irrelevant to the truth of whether practical and theoretical
reasons are the same kind of thing; the process at work might, for instance, be the
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process that allows us to understand truths about logic or mathematics. And that
process may be truth-tracking; cf. Clarke-Doane (2012) and de Lazari-Radek and
Singer (2012: 17-18).
19. See Cowie (2015) and the references therein.
20. See Reisner (2015: 475-476) and Schroeder (2015: §1.1).
21. Thanks to Guy Kahane for pushing me on these two issues.
22. In §3A I argued that we lack good reason to accept an evolutionary debunk-
ing explanation of internalist judgments. But do we lack good reason to accept
a (non-evolutionary) debunking explanation of internalist judgments? Tersman
(2006: 403) suggests that some may accept impartial consequentialism because
they overvalue theoretical simplicity and coherence at the cost of ignoring relevant
differences in cases that count against such simplicity and coherence; perhaps sim-
ilarly it could be argued that internalists accept their view due to overemphasizing
the importance of having a simple and coherent theory of normative reasons. It
seems to me that although this may be true we lack good reason to accept it.
Furthermore, as I explained in supra note 9, in order for a judgment that p to
be debunked we need to have good reason to believe that the thing that it is the
causal result of is irrelevant to whether p which is independent of our beliefs about
whether p. But it does not seem that we have good reason to believe that the val-
uation of simplicity and coherence that underpins judgments about the truth of
impartial consequentialism or internalism are overvaluations that is independent
of our judgments about the truth of impartial consequentialism or internalism:
if we have good reason to believe that Rossian pluralism/externalism is true,
we have good reason to believe that impartial consequentialism/internalism is
false and so good reason to believe that judgments that impartial consequential-
ism/internalism is true based on simplicity and coherence are the result of an
overvaluation of simplicity and coherence. But these good reasons are not inde-
pendent of our beliefs about the truth of impartial consequentialism/internalism.
23. Emphasis added.
24. Or at least that we lack good reason to believe the negation of No Direct Stranger
Concern, which would be enough for the purposes of this paper—see §2. See also
de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s (2012: 26, n. 45) discussion of personal correspon-
dence with Tersman.
25. Kahane (2014: 329 n. 9)
26. See, for instance, Pleasants (2009: esp. 677).
27. See e.g. Dworkin (1995).
28. Cf. de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s case that Sidgwickian impartialist intuitions
are not vulnerable to debunking in §1.
29. It might seem that bodily imperatives just consist in pain states. But beliefs
that we have non-derivative reasons to avoid pain are vulnerable to evolutionary
debunking (see Kahane’s argument in §1B). However, Kahane argues that beliefs
in reasons to avoid pain that derive from the judgment that we have non-derivative
reason to avoid our own pain are vulnerable to evolutionary debunking. But in
this section, I’ve been discussing beliefs that we have reasons to satisfy others’
bodily imperatives that do not derive from the judgment that we have reasons to
satisfy our own bodily imperatives.
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30. If they are, won’t they be debunkable for the reasons that de Lazari-Radek and
Singer argue that egoist views are? (§1A) No. For they argue that the intuition
that we have reasons to promote our own good can be debunked. I’ve argued
that we lack good reason to believe that intuitions such as that epistemic and
practical reasons have the same structure can be debunked. And that because
of this beliefs in internalism on the basis of intuitions like this one cannot be
debunked.
31. See Joyce (2006: 24-26) and the evidence cited therein.
32. See ibid. 41 and the evidence and references therein.
33. See Olson (2014: 142).
34. See Stratton-Lake (2002).
35. Buck-passing accounts of well-being are slightly more complicated; see Rowland
(2019: ch. 5). But this does not matter for our current purposes.
36. Kahane grants this claim (§1B, §4).
37. I would like to thank audiences at the Australasian Association of Philosophy in
Adelaide, the University of Melbourne, and the University of Utrecht, as well as
Jessica Isserow, David Killoren, Guy Kahane, Ole Koksvik, and Pekka Väyrynen
for comments on previous drafts of this paper.
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